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Abstract—The increasing levels of child sex abuse (CSA) media
being shared in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks pose a significant
challenge for law enforcement agencies. Although a number
of P2P monitoring tools to detect offender activity in such
networks exist, they typically rely on hash value databases of
known CSA media. Such an approach cannot detect new or
previously unknown media being shared. Conversely, identifying
such new/previously unknown media is a priority for law en-
forcement – they can be indicators of recent or on-going child
abuse. Furthermore, originators of such media can be hands-
on abusers and their apprehension can safeguard children from
further abuse. The sheer volume of activity on P2P networks,
however, makes manual detection virtually infeasible. In this
paper, we present a novel approach that combines sophisticated
filename and media analysis techniques to automatically flag
new/previously unseen CSA media to investigators. The approach
has been implemented into the iCOP toolkit. Our evaluation on
real case data shows high degrees of accuracy while hands-on
trials with law enforcement officers highlight iCOP’s usability
and its complementarity to existing investigative workflows.
Index Terms—cyber crime; child protection; paedophilia; peer-
to-peer computing; image classification; text analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of the Internet and peer-to-peer file sharing
systems has transformed the distribution of child sexual abuse
media into a crime without geographical boundaries. While
there is scientific debate [1] on whether the online paedophile
is a new type of offender [2] or if those with a pre-disposition
to offend are responding to the opportunities afforded by the
new forms of social media [3], empirical evidence points to the
problem of Internet-based paedophilia as endemic. Recently,
[4] found that 1.6% of searches and 2.4% of responses on the
Gnutella P2P network related to illegal sexual content (e.g.,
rape, bestiality, child abuse). A similar study of the eDonkey
network [5] showed that approximately 2 out of every 1,000
users pursued CSA content. Given the networks’ scale, these
results suggest that, on such file-sharing networks, hundreds
of searches for such illegal images occur each second.
The severity of the problem has resulted in a number of
solutions that can monitor such activity. Tools such as the
Child Protection System (CPS) [6] and RoundUp [7], [8]
are able to capture data about paedophile activity on P2P
networks and identify child abuse media across different P2P
protocols. However, these systems rely on matching the files
shared on a network against a hash-value database of known
CSA media1. As a result, they are not able to identify new
child abuse media that may be released on to the network.
Nor are they able to detect CSA media that is not on record.
Identifying such new/previously unknown media is, however,
critical, because they can be indicators of recent or even on-
going child abuse. Furthermore, originators of such media can
be hands-on abusers and their early detection and apprehension
can safeguard their victims from further abuse.
Detecting new/previously unknown CSA media requires
(semi-)automatic analysis of image and video content. Though
such techniques have already been developed (see e.g. [9],
[10]), so far, they have only provided moderate detection rates,
due to utilizing single feature descriptions. Also, these tools
rely on skin detection techniques, which have been shown to
be only marginally discriminative for CSA content detection
[11]. Moreover, downloading all files being shared in order to
apply such media analysis techniques is clearly infeasible in
a P2P scenario.
In this paper, we present a novel approach for automatically
detecting and classifying new or previously unknown CSA
media on P2P networks. The key contributions of our work
are as follows:
• A new filename classification approach that utilises a
combination of character n-grams and specialised vo-
cabulary used to share CSA media on P2P networks to
automatically identify potential candidates for new CSA
media out of the millions of files that are being shared.
• An improved image and video classification technique
using multiple and, in case of video, multimodal (visual
and audio) feature descriptions leading to a robust and
1Such databases are built over time through post-hoc forensic analysis of
seized computers of offenders.
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highly accurate identification of CSA media content.
• A synthesis of the above two analyses, while disregarding
files with known hash values, to flag the most pertinent
candidates for new/previously unknown child abuse me-
dia.
• Operationalisation of the above analyses and synthesis
into the iCOP toolkit for use in child protection investi-
gations.
Additionally, we describe the results of evaluating our
approach on real CSA filenames and features of CSA media,
which show high degrees of accuracy. Furthermore, a user
evaluation by law enforcement officers highlights the usability
of the iCOP toolkit and its potential to complement and
enhance extant investigative workflows pertaining to CSA
media.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
provides an overview of the related work on detecting CSA
media and associated activity in P2P networks. Section III
describes the key components of our approach, that is, the
filename classification and media classification. Section IV,
outlines the architecture of the iCOP toolkit and discusses
how the two analyses are synthesised to detect new/previously
unknown CSA media. Section V presents the evaluation of our
approach on CSA data and insights from a user trial. Finally,
Section VI concludes the paper, discusses limitations of our
approach and identifies directions for future research.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Policing CSA Media on P2P Networks
Our semi-structured interviews with a sample of P2P in-
vestigators combined with a survey of law enforcement user
requirements exposed a fundamental need for the development
of approaches that enable P2P investigators to identify and
prioritise cases where the target is engaged in the sexual abuse
of children and/or the production of CSA media. Contempo-
rary initiatives to police the exchange of CSA media in P2P
networks are frequently played out in operational settings that
are bound by scant investigative resources. Our analysis shows
how these conditions have exposed a latent conflict of interest
between policing initiatives, which give primacy to the identi-
fication of victims and those that centre upon the apprehension
of the offender, especially the “low hanging fruit” of the
offender population whose offending is limited to second-order
possession or distribution offences [12]. Whether charged with
enforcing the law in respect of broader offences of possession
and distribution, or with the apprehension of producers of
child abuse media, the identification of contact sexual abuse
and abuse victims were cited as paramount concerns for P2P
investigators. This finding resonates with earlier observations
that a primary goal of P2P investigations is to catch child
abusers and help children that are being sexually victimised,
rather than simply detecting and confiscating images in the
context of possession offences [7], [8]. However noble, these
objectives are difficult, nigh impossible to realise using state-
of-the-art tools such as CPS and RoundUp. Such tools, which
identify suspects involved in the exchange of known CSA files,
yield many potential targets for law enforcement but offer little
support for the identification and prioritisation of high-risk
targets. While some preliminary attempts have been made to
utilise materials accessed by suspects to assist in prioritising
which investigations take place first (e.g. [13]), no frameworks
exist to reliably discriminate high-risk targets in P2P policing
contexts – such as those distributing new/previously unknown
CSA media that may indicate recent or on-going child abuse.
B. Text Categorisation
Due to the increased availability of documents in digital
form and, consequently, the need to access them in quick
and flexible ways, content-based document management tasks
have acquired a prominent position in the information sys-
tems field. One such task consists of automatically labelling
natural language texts with a number of predefined thematic
categories, i.e. automatic text categorisation, which is cur-
rently being used in many different contexts, ranging from
document filtering (e.g., spam detection), topic detection and
word sense disambiguation to the population of hierarchical
catalogues of Internet resources. In current text categorisation
studies, the dominant approach to this problem is based on
Machine Learning techniques, in which an inductive process
automatically builds a classifier by learning the characteristics
of the individual categories from a set of documents that were
labelled in pre-processing. The trained classifier can, then,
distinguish between these categories when it is confronted with
new texts showing similar characteristics2.
Although recent work has tackled the problem of detecting
deception [15], masquerading behaviour [16] and identify-
ing paedophile grooming activities [17] online by combin-
ing natural language analysis with Machine Learning, these
studies all operated on larger bodies of text (e.g. chat room
conversations). Contrary to these studies, automatic filename
categorisation typically involves much shorter text fragments,
which inevitably leads to highly sparse data. Additionally,
research has shown that distributors of CSA media tend to
use a specialised vocabulary containing a whole variety of
abbreviations, acronyms and even combinations of different
languages to avoid (automatic) detection of their shared files,
while making them widely searchable for other offenders (e.g.,
“kinderficker”, “kdquality”, “ptsc”) [5]. This vocabulary also
proved to be dynamic, i.e., it evolves as existing keywords
come to the attention of law enforcement [18].
While a number of studies have focused on textual features
that are related to web-accessible images (e.g. [19]–[21]), they
do not address any of these additional challenges. So far, there
are only two studies – to our knowledge – that used lan-
guage analysis techniques to identify CSA media. Firstly, [5]
investigated the feasibility to automatically construct lists of
potential paedopile keywords. Secondly, inspired by previous
work on SMS normalisation (see [22], [23] examined whether
2An introduction to computational methods for text categorisation can be
found in e.g. [14].
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these techniques could also be used to circumvent the issue of
language variation in CSA filenames. Although their work on
pornographic versus non-pornographic filename classification
showed very promising results, we found both their approach
and the keyword approach [5] ineffective when dealing with
the numerous spelling variations incorporated into real CSA
filenames.
In contrast to the above approaches, our approach is not
only able to deal with the specialised vocabulary used for CSA
media, but also takes into account spelling variations and other
noise often used to obfuscate CSA filenames in P2P networks.
C. Media Classification
In recent years, quite some work on detecting pornography
in images and videos has been published. Most of these studies
focus on the utilisation of skin based features (e.g. [24], [25]
and [26]) or bag-of-visual-word features (e.g. [27]). These
techniques can also be applied to video data by drawing
keyframes from the video stream and extracting image features
like colour histograms and skin features (e.g. [28]) or skin
area shapes (e.g. [29]). For video data, prior research also
incorporated acoustic features, such as MFCCs [30] or so-
called audio words [31], which entails an analogue approach
to the visual words technique, based on vector quantisation.
Furthermore, motion features, such as motion histograms [32]
and the autocorrelation of motion signals [33], have been
considered for pornography detection as well.
So far, only few studies have investigated the feasibility to
identify CSA data based on visual features (e.g. [34]). The
authors of [35] use RGB based skin detection in conjunction
with filename analysis and a hash-based detection method.
Another quite common approach, especially in forensics, is
searching for visually similar image media in an index of
already known images as presented in [36] and [37]. How-
ever, these methods appear inadequate for the detection of
new/previously unknown media.
In our approach, we consider representatives of all of these
feature types, except for the motion modality, because they
have shown a strong dependency on the utilised video codec
and by that generalise poorly for other media sources (see
[38]). Contrary to previous approaches to detect CSA media,
content describing visual and acoustic features are not used in
isolation, but in combination. This has shown promising results
for pornography detection in, e.g. [38]. Moreover, instead of
using only a single visual modality, we combine a range
of various visual and non-visual features for detecting CSA
content. Fusing the classification results of different features
and modalities enables us to create the most comprehensive
trainable CSA content detection system for image and video
data to date.
III. APPROACH
In this section, we elaborate on each of the key components
of the iCOP toolkit individually. More specifically, we describe
our data collection and preprocessing, together with the feature
engineering process. We discuss how the filename and media
classification modules are integrated into the architecture of
the iCOP toolkit to flag the most pertinent candidates for
new/previously unknown child abuse media in Section IV.
A. Filename Classification
Our approach to identifying filenames that possibly contain
CSA media is based on automatic text categorisation (see
Section II-B). This involves (1) the compilation of a pre-
labelled dataset (in our case CSA versus non-CSA filenames),
(2) selecting potentially discriminative linguistic features and
(3) building a classification model that can attribute new texts
automatically to one of the predefined classes with sufficient
reliability. However, building a filename classifier that is
sufficiently robust so it can be employed by an automatic
environment such as the iCOP toolkit is a difficult task for a
variety of reasons. Firstly, crawling for CSA files directly from
a P2P network to acquire training data is illegal. Hence, we
could only use CSA-related filenames that we were allowed to
collect from closed court case files. This resulted in a corpus
of 268 filenames for the CSA class. Since we aimed to create
a classifier that focuses on exactly those textual features that
distinguish CSA from adult pornographic media, for the non-
CSA class, we crawled filenames that were linked to legal
pornography media. Hence, we collected a total of 10,000
non-CSA filenames from PicHunter, PornoHub, RedTube and
Xvideos3 (see also [23]). During training, this class imbalance
was maintained to simulate a real-life data distribution in a
P2P network. Moreover, while prior research mainly focused
on automatically identifying and/or normalising typical key-
words that are used by Internet paedophiles to camouflage
their files’ illegal content (see Section II-B), we applied a
more comprehensive approach during the feature selection
process by combining paedophile keyword information with
other linguistic features. More specifically, we first created a
dictionary-based filter containing a manually extended version
of the paedophile keyword lists from the MAPAP project
[5]. We further extended this filter with forms of explicit
language use (e.g., “handjob”) and expressions relating to
children (e.g., “kiddie”) and family relations (e.g., “daughter”).
Together, these four categories, i.e., the paedophile keywords,
the explicit keywords, the child references and the family
references, form our Semantic features. Hence, a filename
without any paedophile keywords can still become a high-
value target with regard to CSA media when it contains, for
example, both explicit keywords and references to children.
We show an example of the feature construction in Table I.
The presence of the keyword “pt” (preteen) results in a hit
for the paedophile keywords category, while “12yo” (12 years
old) is identified as a reference to a child.
Secondly, we extracted all patterns of two, three and four
consecutive characters from the filenames (also called Char-
acter n-gram features). As can be seen from the example
in Table I, this approach allowed us to circumvent the issue
3www.pichunter.com, www.porno-hub.com, www.redtube.com,
www.xvideos.com
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of alternative keyword spellings: although the actual keyword
“lolita” is not present in the example filename, the presence
of the “lita” feature could be equally discriminative when
training the classifier, because that feature is also present in
filenames that do contain the original keyword. Additionally,
other potential cues could be detected by the model, even when
they were related to new/unknown keywords that are not (yet)
included in the semantic features.
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF A CSA FILENAME AFTER FEATURE CONSTRUCTION
Original filename ptl0lita12yo.jpeg
2-gram feats. pt tl l0 0l li it ta a1 12 2y yo
3-gram feats. ptl tl0 l0l 0li lit ita ta1 a12 12y 2yo
4-gram feats. ptl0 tl0l l0li 0lit lita ita1 ta12 a12y 12yo
Semantic feats. paedo keyword child ref
B. Media Classification
As we process both images and videos, the content classi-
fication module contains two input streams: (a) images, being
fed into the feature extraction pipeline directly, and (b) video
files, that are pre-processed by extracting video frames and a
continuous audio stream. For frame extraction, the input video
is split into shots of 100 frames. The centre frame of each of
these video segments is taken as a representative keyframe for
the extraction of visual features. Additionally, audio features
are computed for all 4s segments, respectively. For describing
the visual content of images and video frames we extract:
colour-correlograms, skin features, visual words and visual
pyramids. The audio information of video files is described by
computing vector quantised MFCC features (i.e. audio words).
In the following, a brief description of the utilised feature
extractions is presented:
• Colour-Correlograms describe the occurrence probabil-
ity of a colour in a pixel’s neighbourhood (see e.g.
[39], [40], [41], [42]). Hence, they represent the local
spatial correlation of colours in images. Here, we apply
a special variant of the colour-correlogram, namely the
auto-colour-correlogram, which describes the probability
of the identical colour c reoccurring within a distance d
of the current pixel in image I .
αdc(I) = γ
d
c,c(I) (1)
For an optimal performance, this feature is computed in
HSV colour space ([40]).
• The Skin-Feature is based on a RGB skin colour model,
which was generated using manually segmented images
from the COMPAQ database. The presence of skin is
indicated via a skin-probability-map (SPM) (see also
[25]).
P (skin|c) = Pskin(c)
Pskin(c) + Pnon−skin(c)
(2)
For computing the skin feature, first the SPM is trans-
ferred into a skin-segmentation-mask (SSM) via mor-
phological operations and adaptive thresholding. Next,
the mean intensities of SPM and SSM are calculated,
as well as their center and variance of skin mass. This
yields a 14 dimensional descriptor representing image
skin properties.
• Because colour features – especially skin features – are
not very robust towards illumination changes, we also
computed Visual Words and Pyramids to provide a tex-
ture based content representation. Visual words features
are computed by scaling the given image to 250 × 250
and extracting patches of 8× 8 using a regular sampling
with a step size of 5 pixels. Next, the DCT coefficients
of the YUV transformed patches are computed for each
channel. The final feature is represented by 36 low
frequency coefficients from the Y-channel and 21 taken
from U and V, respectively. Our visual pyramid features
are based on the same representation and are structured
according to [44]. Applying 2, 000 entry codebooks for
vector quantisation yields the final representation of both
features.
• The audio stream of video files is described by extracting
Audio Words, using the widely used Mel Frequency
Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) [43]. We extract MFCCs
in steps of 8ms, using a 16ms sliding window. Next,
a frequency histogram is computed from the Fourier
transform of the signal. For reflecting human acoustic
perception, the frequency histogram is weighted by the
logarithmic Mel scale. Finally, the weighted histograms
are DCT encoded, leading to a 13 dimensional descriptor,
which are vector quantised using a 1, 000 entry codebook.
IV. THE ICOP TOOLKIT
The filename and image classification approaches are syn-
thesised in the iCOP toolkit to identify new/previously un-
known CSA media. As shown in Figure 1, the toolkit has two
major components: the P2P Engine and the iCOP Analysis
Engine.
Fig. 1. Overview of the iCOP toolkit
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The P2P engine provides functionality to monitor public
traffic on a P2P network. Currently, the P2P engine supports
monitoring of such traffic on Gnutella but other monitors can
be plugged into the engine. The monitor extracts information
such as IP addresses, filenames and hash values of files as
well as meta data, such as when a particular peer was last
seen sharing a file. The latter is essential to identify originator
of a new CSA file. This information is passed on to the iCOP
analysis engine which undertakes the following steps:
1) It compares the hash values of files against a list of known
hashes. As we mentioned above, such hash value lists
are established by law enforcement when CSA media
are seized. This filtering mechanism ensures that the
system disregards known CSA media. The user interface
does indicate when a peer is sharing known CSA media,
but the toolkit does not download or process the files
given the focus on identifying new/previously unknown
CSA media. This significantly reduces both storage and
computation requirements. We currently use a file of
SHA1 hashes in base-32 (one hash per line). We do so
because this is the most common format in which law
enforcement store hash values for CSA media. The design
enables law enforcement officers using the toolkit to plug-
in their own hash value lists without substantial effort to
import them into a specific format or database.
2) The names of files that do not occur in the known hash
list are passed on to the filename classifier for identifying
their likelihood of containing CSA media. File names that
are deemed to be non-CSA media are discarded.
3) Files that are flagged by the filename classifier as poten-
tially containing CSA media are passed back to the P2P
engine for downloading. The downloaded files are piped
back to the iCOP analysis engine, more specifically, to
the media classifier to determine if the content is indeed
CSA media.
The results of the analysis are stored in real-time in the
database. An investigator can login to the GUI to access the
iCOP “dashboard” which flags the most pertinent candidates
for CSA media as the highest priority. Additionally, the user
can view thumbnails as well as the full media files to verify
whether the flagged items are indeed CSA media. If so, these
items can be marked “confirmed” by the user and are fed
back into the hash database so that they are considered to be
known child abuse media in future searches. This setup enables
the toolkit to triage the files that need to be downloaded and
analysed by the image classifier.
The toolkit GUI is designed around a list of connections,
which maps closely to the way P2P software works. A
connection is defined as:
connection = IP address + Port + GUID
Each connection is assumed to be a single user sharing a
given set of files from a specific location. This is in contrast
with an IP address alone, which could potentially be shared
by multiple users (e.g., several machines in a home) or a
GUID alone, which could potentially be used from different
locations (e.g., work, home, travel). The toolkit can display
files shared by a particular IP or a particular GUID. Hence,
an investigator can easily view which connections are related
via a common IP address or GUID. As mentioned above,
the most pertinent candidates are flagged to the user as high
priority via the dashboard. Given legal constraints governing
law enforcement, the toolkit can also be configured to focus on
particular geo-locations (e.g., a particular country or region).
Additionally, the toolkit provides a demo mode to allow testing
and debugging the toolkit using dummy P2P network data
and legal pornography. This is because any monitoring and
downloading of CSA media can only take place at suitable
law enforcement premises.
V. EVALUATION
A. Filename Classification
To obtain a reliable estimation of the classifier’s perfor-
mance, we performed five-fold cross validation (see [45])
during the experiments. In this experimental regime, the
available data is randomised and divided into five equally
sized folds or partitions. Subsequently, each partition is used
four times in training and once in test. For classification, we
used the SVM algorithm as implemented in LibShortText [46],
an open-source software package for short-text classification
and analysis. Parameters were experimentally determined on
a development set of each training partition during cross
validation. The scores we report are average precision, recall
and F-score. These are standard evaluation metrics that can
be computed based on the number of true positives (tp), true
negatives (tn), false positives (fp) and false negatives (fn) in
a confusion matrix. The recall score for each class provides
information on the number of filenames that were successfully
retrieved, while the precision score takes into account all
retrieved filenames for each class and evaluates how many of
them were actually relevant. The F-score is then the harmonic
mean of precision and recall. These measures are defined as
follows.
Precision =
tp
tp+ fp
(3)
Recall =
tp
tp+ fn
(4)
Fscore = 2
Precision ·Recall
Precision+Recall
(5)
The results of the experiments are shown in Table II. The
best results were achieved when combining the character n-
gram features with the semantic features, leading to an overall
precision of 89.9%. We further tested our trained classifier
with a sample of 40,000 CSA filenames and 40,000 legal
pornographic filenames. This resulted in a 92.9% precision, a
52.5% recall and an F-score of 67.1% for the CSA filenames
and an overall accuracy of 73.0%.
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TABLE II
RESULTS OF THE FILENAME CLASSIFIER USING DIFFERENT FEATURE
TYPES
Scores (%) Precision Recall F-score
CSA FILENAMES
Semantic feats. 5.7 21.3 9.0
Char. n-grams 89.8 62.3 73.6
Combined 89.9 66.1 76.1
NON-CSA FILENAMES
Semantic feats. 97.7 90.6 94.0
Char. n-grams 99.0 99.8 99.4
Combined 99.1 99.8 99.5
B. Media Classification
For our experiments in classifying CSA media, we decided
to evaluate two scenarios that have been triggered by practical
aspects of law enforcement investigations: (1) detection of
CSA content versus regular media content (world) and (2)
separation of CSA from legal pornographic media (adult).
As CSA media content can be considered a subclass of
pornography, the second scenario is expected to be much
more challenging. All three content classes were represented
by 20, 000 images and 1, 000 short videos each, which have
been collected from various web sources like flickr.com,
youtube.com, pichunter.com, redtube.com, and pornhub.com.
Numerical feature representations for instances of CSA media
were provided by European law enforcement. During the
experiments, first, we extracted all features from the data
(see Section III-B), followed by a selection of 1, 500 training
and 3, 000 test samples representing positive and negative
classes in equal amounts. Next, all extracted features f were
presented to separate statistical classifiers. We use SVM’s,
as they have shown superior performance compared to other
options (e.g. [38]). For estimating the SVM parameters C and
γ, we performed a 5-fold cross validation. Finally, the scores
of the individual classifiers were combined using a weighted
sum late fusion scheme, yielding a multi-modal classification
score for a 4s video segment or image X .
P (CSA|X) =
∑
f
wf · P f (CSA|X) (6)
The weights wf for late fusing the trained classifiers were
found by grid searching possible classifier combinations. Av-
eraging the performance of all 5 folds provided the numerical
results of the experiments, presented in terms of average
precision (AvP) and equal error rates (EER). Both measures
are commonly used in information retrieval and biometrics,
whereas the AvP is based on a ranked list of results and
represents the area under the recall precision curve. It can be
computed according to Equation 7, with r being the current
rank of the sorted list of N items, P (r) the precision at rank r,
rel(r) an indicating function being 1 if the item at r is relevant
and 0 otherwise, and Dr the number of relevant items in the
analysed set.
AvP =
∑N
r=1 P (r)× rel(r)
Dr
(7)
Instead, the EER marks the rate at which the number of false
positive and false negative classifications are equal.
As can be seen in Tables III and IV, our classifiers reach
average precision in excess of 92% (image) and 95% (video)
when compared with adult pornography.
TABLE III
LATE FUSION WEIGHTS wf AND CLASSIFICATION RESULTS (SINGLE AND
FUSED) FOR CSA DETECTION IN IMAGES.
CSA vs World CSA vs Adult
Feature wf AvP EER wf AvP EER
ccorrelogram 0.55 92.93 14.03 0.65 91.07 16.83
vispyramids 0.40 91.36 16.08 0.35 87.41 20.58
skin segment 0.05 81.32 26.43 0.00 74.24 33.60
fused 94.69 11.70 92.09 15.53
TABLE IV
LATE FUSION WEIGHTS wf AND CLASSIFICATION RESULTS (SINGLE AND
FUSED) FOR CSA DETECTION IN VIDEOS.
CSA vs World CSA vs Adult
Feature wf AvP EER wf AvP EER
audiowords 0.40 88.34 16.23 0.45 90.24 15.28
ccorrelogram 0.30 90.15 13.95 0.35 86.07 16.08
vispyramids 0.20 89.88 14.08 0.20 82.02 19.44
viswords 0.10 90.38 13.77 0.00 79.41 20.45
fused 97.32 7.51 95.65 8.19
C. User Evaluation
We conducted a live testing workshop with 9 law enforce-
ment officers engaged in CSA investigations on P2P networks
from 7 different law enforcement agencies across Europe.
Given the legal (as well as ethical) issues pertaining to such
a live exercise, the two day workshop was conducted on
law enforcement premises. The participants were provided
background information on the toolkit as well as details of how
the analysis is performed by the backend. They were provided
training in the use of the user interface followed by actual use
of the toolkit on live data. A lot of usability feedback was
gathered in focus-group style discussions and used to improve
the functionality and the user interface subsequently. At the
end of the workshop, a questionnaire was completed by the
participants. Each question was answered according to a 7-
point Likert scale (1 - strongly disagree ... 7 - strongly agree)
and had room for comments. The questions were as follows:
1) Overall, the toolkit is easy to use.
2) It was easy to learn to use this toolkit.
3) The toolkit has all the capabilities I need to prioritise
investigations.
4) I believe the toolkit can facilitate my investigations.
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5) I believe the toolkit will allow me to more efficiently
carry out investigations.
6) I believe the toolkit will assist me in efficiently analysing
the large number of files shared on P2P networks.
7) I would frequently use this toolkit as part of my investi-
gations.
8) Overall, I believe the toolkit to be a valuable aid to law
enforcement.
The results are summarised in Table V where Q is the
question and P the participant. Participant 8 was a consistent
outlier in terms of low scores. Hence, we present the results
after omitting the outlier responses from P8. Particularly
noteworthy is the positive feedback for ease of use (Q1, 5.4/7),
ease of learning (Q2, 5.8/7), facilitation of investigations (Q4,
5.8/7), and value for law enforcement (Q8, 6.1/7).
TABLE V
SURVEY RESULTS
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Mean Std
P1 7.0 7.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 6.0 0.7
P2 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 5.8 0.4
P3 7.0 7.0 4.5 6.0 6.0 4.0 7.0 7.0 6.1 1.1
P4 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 4.1 0.9
P5 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 6.3 0.7
P6 6.0 7.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 7.0 5.5 1.0
P7 5.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 6.0 7.0 5.0 7.0 6.0 0.9
P9 3.0 4.0 3.0 5.0 3.0 4.0 3.0 5.0 3.8 0.8
Mean 5.4 5.8 5.1 5.8 5.3 5.0 5.1 6.1 5.4
Std 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.1
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented the iCOP toolkit: a forensic
software package that is designed to highlight sharers of
new or unknown child sexual abuse media in P2P networks.
Additionally, it offers secondary features, such as showing
sharers of known CSA files and allowing law enforcement
investigators to see other files shared by the same computer
or other IP addresses used by the same P2P client. Hence, the
software allows law enforcement to more rapidly locate the
producers of such content and the victims therein.
Although the current realisation of both the filename and
the image classification modules already provide very good
results, they could be further optimised. Firstly, the classifi-
cation of images is still limited by operating only on low-
level visual features. Future research can potentially address
this in multiple ways. While CSA video classification can
be significantly improved by additionally using other modal-
ities, i.e., audio or motion information, image classification
could be extended by utilising high-level visual features. For
example, the novel SentiBank feature [47], which consists
1, 200 classifier scores indicating the presence of pre-trained
concepts, could achieve some orthogonality towards low-
level descriptions in feature space, because they build up on
different information sources. Another challenge for future
research is the age verification of individuals appearing in
questioned images and videos. Though evaluations have been
conducted during the development of the media classification
module, current approaches to determine the age of persons
for supporting the classification decision cannot provide the
robustness that is needed in an automated environment such
as the iCOP toolkit. Also, the filename classification module
could be enhanced by retraining on larger datasets of CSA
filenames.
Furthermore, the same techniques for monitoring, analysing
file names, and analysing content that we propose for the
Gnutella network could also be applied to other file sharing
systems, such as eDonkey and Bittorrent. Monitoring these
networks, however, will require different software libraries for
each protocol and may yield different types of information that
require slightly different database structures. In addition, some
protocols rely on central servers and will need to be manually
configured to monitor the servers of interest. Finally, quite a
few networks are designed to provide anonymity and prevent
freeloading. These issues will provide a further venue for our
future work.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was funded by the European Commission Safer
Internet Programme project (SI-2010-TP-2601002), iCOP:
Identifying and Catching Originators in Peer-to-Peer Net-
works, the Impact Acceleration Account of Lancaster Uni-
versity and by the Antwerp University, DAPHNE: Defending
Against Paedophiles in Heterogeneous Network Environments.
The authors would also like to thank all law enforcement
agencies that have contributed to this project. Finally, special
thanks go out to Interpol. Without their efforts, our research
would have been impossible.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Middleton, “Internet Sex Offenders”, Ch. 12 in Assessment and
Treatment of Sex Offenders: A Handbook, 2009.
[2] E. Quayle, G. Holland, C. Linehan, M. Taylor, “The Internet and
Offending Behaviour: A Case Study”, Journal of Sexual Aggression,
vol. 6, pp. 78-96, 2000.
[3] A. Cooper, “Sexuality and the Internet: Surfing into the New Millenium”,
Cyberpsychology and Behavior, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 187-193, 1998.
[4] D. Hughes, J. Walkerdine, G. Coulson, S. Gibson, “Is Deviant Behaviour
the Norm on P2P File-Sharing Networks?”, IEEE Distributed Systems
Online, vol. 7, no. 2, 2006.
[5] M. Latapy, C. Magnien, R. Fournier, “Quantifying paedophile activity
in a large P2P system”, Information Processing and Management, vol.
49, no. 1, pp. 248-263, 2013.
[6] Child Protection System. P2P Monitoring software developed at TLO,
http://www.tlo.com/, USA.
[7] M. Liberatore, R. Erdely, T. Kerle, B. Levine, C. Shields, “Forensic
Investigation of Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Networks”, In Proceedings of
the DFRWS Annual Digital Forensics Research Conference, 2010.
[8] M. Liberatore, B. Levine, C. Shields, “Strengthening forensic investi-
gations of child pornography on P2P networks”, In Proceedings of the
ACM Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technolo-
gies (CoNEXT), 2010.
[9] FIVES: Forensic Image and Video Examination Support. EC Safer
Internet project. More information can be found at http://fives.kau.se
[10] I-Dash: The Investigator’s Dashboard. EC Safer Internet project. More
information can be found at http://www.i-dash.eu/
130
[11] C. Schulze, D. Henter, D. Borth, A. Dengel, “Automatic Detection of
Child Pornography by Multi-modal Feature Fusion for Law Enforcement
Support”, In Proceedings of the International Conference on Multimedia
Retrieval, 2014, to appear in.
[12] Y. Jewkes, C. Andrews, “Policing the filth: the problems of investigating
online child pornography in England and Wales”, Policing and Society,
vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 42-62, 2005.
[13] M. McManus, M. Long, L. Alison, “Child Pornography Offenders:
Towards an evidence-based approach to prioritizing the investigation
of indecent image offences”, In L. Alison, L. Rainbow (eds.), Profes-
sionalizing offender profiling: Forensic and investigative psychology in
practice, pp. 178-188, 2011.
[14] F. Sebastiani, “Machine learning in automated text categorization”, ACM
Computing Surveys, vol. 34, pp. 147, 2002.
[15] S. Afroz, M. Brennan, R. Greenstadt, “Detecting Hoaxes, Frauds,
and Deception in Writing Style Online”, In Proceedings of the IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 461-475, 2012.
[16] A. Rashid, A. Baron, P. Rayson, C. May-Chahal, P. Greenwood,
J. Walkerdine, “Who Am I? Analyzing Digital Personas in Cybercrime
Investigations”, IEEE Computer, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 54-61, 2013.
[17] G. Inches, F. Crestani,“Overview of the International Sexual Predator
Identication Competition at PAN-2012”, In P. Forner, J. Karlgren, and
C. Womser-Hacker (eds.), CLEF 2012 Evaluation Labs and Workshop
Working Notes Papers, 2012.
[18] D. Hughes, P. Rayson, J. Walkerdine, K. Lee, P. Greenwood, A. Rashid,
C. May-Chahal, M. Brennan, “Supporting Law Enforcement in Digital
Communities through Natural Language Analysis”, In Proceedings of
the International Workshop on Computational Forensics, 2008.
[19] F. Wang, M. Kan, “NPIC: Hierarchical synthetic image classification
using image search and generic features”, In Proceedings of the Con-
ference on Image and Video Retrieval, pp. 473-482, 2006.
[20] W. Huang, W. Huang, C. Tan, W. Leow, “Model-based chart image
recognition”, In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Graphics
Recognition, pp. 87-99, 2003.
[21] E. Munson, Y. Tsymbalenko, “To search for images on the web, look
at the text, then look at the images”, In Proceedings of the 1st interna-
tional workshop on Web Document Analysis, http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/
wda2001, 2001.
[22] R. Beaufort, S. Roekhaut, L. Cougnon, C. Fairon, “A hybrid rule/model-
based finite-state framework for normalizing SMS messages”, In Pro-
ceedings of ACL, pp. 770-779, 2010.
[23] A. Panchenko, R. Beaufort, C. Fairon, “Detection of Child Sexual Abuse
Media on P2P Networks: Normalization and Classification of Associated
Filenames”. In Proceedings of Workshop on Language Resources for
Public Security Applications of the 8th International Conference on
Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC), 2012.
[24] H. Rowley, Y. Jing, S. Baluja. “Large Scale Image-Based Adult-Content
Filtering”, Int. Conf. Comp. Vis. Theory and Applications, pp. 290-296,
2006.
[25] M. Jones, J. Rehg, “Statistical Color Models with Application to Skin
Detection”, Int. J. Comput. Vision, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 81-96, 2002.
[26] M. Fleck, D. Forsyth, C. Bregler, “Finding Naked People”, ECCV, pp.
593-602, 1996.
[27] T. Deselaers, L. Pimenidis, H. Ney, “Bag-of-Visual-Words Models for
Adult Image Classification and Filtering”, ICPR, pp. 1-4, 2008.
[28] H. Lee, S. Lee, T. Nam, “Implementation of high performance objec-
tionable video classification system”, ICACT, pp. 959-962, 2006.
[29] C. Kim, O. Kwon, W. Kim, S. Choi, “Automatic System for Filtering
Obscene Video”, In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
on Advanced Communication Technology, pp. 1435-1438, 2008.
[30] H. Zuo, O. Wu, W. Hu, B. Xu, “Recognition of Blue Movies by Fusion
of Audio and Video”, In Proc. of ICME, pp. 37-40, 2008.
[31] Y. Liu, X. Wang, Y. Zhang, S. Tang, “Fusing Audio-Words with
Visual Features for Pornographic Video Detection”, In Proceedings of
TRUSTCOM’11, pp. 1488-1493, 2011.
[32] C. Jansohn, A. Ulges, T. Breuel, “Detecting Pornographic Video Content
by Combining Image Features with Motion Information”, ACM Multi-
media, 2009.
[33] T. Xiaofeng, L. Duan, C. Xu, Q. Tian, L. Hanqing, J. Wang, J. Jin,
“Periodicity Detection of Local Motion”, IEEE International Conference
on Multimedia and Expo, pp. 650-653, 2005.
[34] A. Ulges, A. Stahl, “Automatic Detection of Child Pornography using
Color Visual Words”, In Proc. of the Int. Conf. Multimedia and Expo,
2011.
[35] P. da Silva Eleuterio, M. de Castro Polastro, “An adaptive sampling
strategy for automatic detection of child pornographic videos”, Int. Conf.
on Forensic Computer Science, pp. 12-19, 2012.
[36] LTU Engine, available from http://www.ltutech.com/en/products/ltu-
engine-2 (retrieved: June 2010).
[37] Netclean Analyze, available from http://www.netclean.com/ (retrieved:
June 2010).
[38] A. Ulges, C. Schulze, D. Borth, A. Stahl, “Pornography detection in
video benefits (a lot) from a multi-modal approach”, Workshop on Audio
and Multimedia Methods for Large-Scale Video Analysis, ACM, 2012.
[39] J. Huang, S. Kumar, M. Mitra, W Zhu, R. Zabih, “Image Indexing Using
Color Correlograms”, CVPR, pp. 762-768, 1997.
[40] T. Ojala, M. Rautiainen, E. Matinmikko, M. Aittola. “Semantic Image
Retrieval with HSV Correlograms”, In Proceedings of the 12th Scandi-
navian Conference on Image Analysis, pp. 621-627, 2001.
[41] M. Rautiainen, T. Ojala, “Color Correlograms in Image and Video
Retrieval”, In Proceedings of the 10th Finnish Artificial Intelligence
Conference, pp. 203-212, 2002.
[42] Z. Zha, Y. Liu, T. Mei, X. Hua, “Video concept detection using support
vector machines - trecvid 2007 evaluations”, Technical report, 2008.
[43] B. Logan, “Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients for Music Modeling”,
Int. Symposium on Music Inf. Retrieval, 2000.
[44] S. Lazebnik, C. Schmid, J. Ponce, “Beyond bags of features: Spatial
pyramid matching for recognizing natural scene categories”, IEEE Com-
puter Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
vol. 2, pp 2169-2178, 2006.
[45] S. Weiss, C. Kulikowski, Computer Systems that Learn: classification
and prediction methods from statistics, neural nets, machine learning,
and expert systems, Morgan Kaufmann: San Mateo, USA, 1991.
[46] H. Yu, C. Ho, Y. Juan, C. Lin, “LibShortText: A Library
for Short-text Classification and Analysis”, Technical Report,
http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/ cjlin/papers/libshorttext.pdf, 2013.
[47] D. Borth, R. Ji, T. Chen, T. Breuel, S. Chang, “Large-scale Visual
Sentiment Ontology and Detectors Using Adjective Noun Pairs”, ACM
Multimedia, 2013.
131
